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List of Acronyms 
  
ASBJ Accounting Standards Board of Japan 
AcSB Accounting Standards Board (Canada)  
AOSSG Asian-Oceanian Standard-Setters Group  
ASAF Accounting Standards Advisory Board 
ASSC Accounting Standards Steering Committee  
BAC Business Accounting Council (Japan)  
CICPA Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
CPC Brazilian Accounting Pronouncements Committee 
ECSDA European Central Securities Depositories Association 
EFRAG European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority 
FASB Financial Accounting Standards Board (U.S.) 
FPSB Financial Planning Standards Board 
FSB Financial Stability Board 
FRRP Financial Reporting Review Panel 
FVA Fair Value Accounting 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
GLASS Group of Latin American Accounting Standard Setters 
HAASOB Hellenic Accounting and Auditing Standards Oversight Board  
HCMC Hellenic Capital Market Commission  
HFSB Hedge Fund Standards Board 
HFSF Hellenic Financial Stability Fund 
IAS International Accounting Standards 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
IASC International Accounting Standards Committee 
ICAEW Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Whales  
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission  
IFAC International Federation of Accountants 
IFRIC IFRS Interpretation Committee  
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards  
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 
ISO International Standards Organization  
KASB Korean Accounting Standards Board 
PAFA Pan African Federation of Accountants 
SEC Securities Exchange Commission 












































































































































































































































































































































































































 Partial	 Partial	 Potential	for	
Country	 Cooperation	 Coordination	 Noncompliance		
Argentina	 No	 No	 Yes	
Australia	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Brazil	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Canada	 No	 Yes	 No	
China	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
European	Union	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	








Table	1.1	(cont.)	 	 	 	
	 Partial	 Partial	 Potential	for	
Country	 Cooperation	 Coordination	 Noncompliance		
Germany	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
India	 Yes	 No	 Yes	
Indonesia	 No	 No	 No	
Italy	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Japan	 Yes	 No	 Yes	
Korea	(South)	 No	 Yes	 No	
Mexico	 No	 No	 No	
Russia	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
Saudi	Arabia	 No	 No	 No	
South	Africa	 No	 Yes	 No	
Turkey	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
United	Kingdom	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	

































































































































































































	 	 	 	 	
Country	 Public	Firms	 Private	Firms	
Argentina	 IFRS	required	for	some	 IFRS	not	permitted	
	 	 	 	 	
Australia		 Local	IFRS	required	for	all	 IFRS	Permitted	for	some	
	 	 	 	 	
Brazil	 Local	IFRS	required	for	all	 IFRS	not	permitted	
	 	 	 	 	
Chile	 IFRS	required	for	all	 IFRS	required	for	all	
	 	 	 	 	
Germany	 EU	IFRS	 Mix	of	IFRS/German	GAAP	
	 	 	 	 	
India	 Mix	of	IFRS/Indian	GAAP	 IFRS	not	permitted	
	 	 	 	 	
Netherlands	 EU	IFRS	 IFRS	permitted	
	 	 	 	 	
Russia	 U.S.	GAAP/IFRS	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Saudi	Arabia	 IFRS	for	Banks/Insurance	 IFRS	not	permitted	

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Capital	Importer	 1.093•	 	 	 	
	 (0.705)	 	 	 	
Trade	Deficit	 1.310**	 	 	 	
	 (0.664)	 	 	 	
Positive	Capital	Account	 	 0.622*	 	 0.606**	
	 	 (0.313)	 	 (0.290)	
Net	FDI	 	 	 0.018**	 	
	 	 	 (0.008)	 	
Net	Trade	 	 0.014*	 0.012**	 	
	 	 (0.008)	 (0.006)	 	
External	Trade	Balance	 	 	 	 0.013*	
	 	 	 	 (0.007)	
GDP	 0.573**	 0.791**	 0.713**	 0.982**	
	 (0.162)	 (0.210)	 (0.190)	 (0.272)	
Credit	Access	 	 	 	 -0.007	
	 	 	 	 (0.006)	
Polity	Score	 0.060	 0.068	 0.081	 0.081	
	 (0.048)	 (0.057)	 (0.055)	 (0.061)	
GDP	Growth	 0.125	 0.200	 0.200	 0.044	
	 (0.118)	 (0.151)	 (0.142)	 (0.113)	
Inflation	 -0.206**	 -0.222**	 -0.315**	 -0.325**	
	 (0.089)	 (0.105)	 (0.102)	 (0.127)	
Market	Development	 -0.250**	 -0.284**	 -0.408**	 -0.382**	
	 (0.116)	 (0.135)	 (0.143)	 (0.160)	
	








	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Full	Cooperation	 4.247***	 	 2.553*	 	
	 (1.128)	 	 (1.307)	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Partial	Cooperation	 	 6.813***	 	 3.930**	
	 	 (1.387)	 	 (1.644)	
	 	 	 	 	
Economic	Growth	 1.074***	 1.042***	 0.214	 0.198	
	 (0.216)	 (0.211)	 (0.247)	 (0.246)	
	 	 	 	 	
GDP	 -0.000*	 -0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	 (0.000)	
	 	 	 	 	
Polity	Score	 -0.025	 -0.031	 -0.006	 -0.009	
	 (0.109)	 (0.107)	 (0.126)	 (0.126)	
	 	 	 	 	
Credit	Access	 -1.157***	 -0.809**	 -0.347	 -0.141	
	 (0.400)	 (0.397)	 (0.461)	 (0.468)	
	 	 	 	 	
Market	Value	 0.110***	 0.097***	 -0.099***	 -0.106***	
	 (0.026)	 (0.026)	 (0.030)	 (0.030)	
	 	 	 	 	
Inflation	 0.747***	 0.643***	 -0.028	 -0.090	
	 (0.246)	 (0.239)	 (0.283)	 (0.280)	
	 	 	 	 	
	
Observations	 261	 261	 267	 267	














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Market	Development	 0.138*	 0.183**	 0.240**	 0.273**	
	 (0.079)	 (0.077)	 (0.078)	 (0.076)	
Regulator	Quality	 0.946**	 	 0.557*	 	
	 (0.386)	 	 (0.321)	 	
Rule	of	Law	 	 0.650*	 	 0.182	
	 	 (0.338)	 	 (0.281)	
Foreign	Creditors	 -0.003	 -0.002	 -0.001	 0.001	
	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	
GDP	 -0.086	 -0.087	 -0.414**	 -0.388**	
	 (0.140)	 (0.140)	 (0.128)	 (0.128)	
Polity	 0.003	 0.018	 -0.058• -0.042	
	 (0.037)	 (0.036)	 (0.036)	 (0.035)	
Manufacturing	 0.002	 0.003	 -0.001	 0.001	
	 (0.007)	 (0.007)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	
FDI	2005	 0.002	 0.011	 0.002	 0.006	
	 (0.040)	 (0.041)	 (0.032)	 (0.032)	
	






















































	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Rule	of	Law	 0.147	 	 -0.763*	 	
	 (0.356)	 	 (0.410)	 	
Regulator	Quality	 	 0.304	 	 -1.129**	
	 	 (0.400)	 	 (0.476)	
Market	Development	 0.041	 0.023	 -0.197**	 -0.144*	
	 (0.085)	 (0.089)	 (0.092)	 (0.094)	
Foreign	Credit	Reliance	 -0.015**	 -0.016**	 -0.002	 -0.001	
	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.005)	 (0.005)	
GDP	 0.355**	 0.351**	 0.400**	 0.401**	
	 (0.159)	 (0.158)	 (0.174)	 (0.177)	
Polity	 -0.030	 -0.036	 0.022	 0.041	
	 (0.038)	 (0.039)	 (0.046)	 (0.049)	
Manufacturing	 0.004	 0.003	 -0.005	 -0.003	
	 (0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.008)	 (0.008)	
FDI	2005	 0.040	 0.037	 -0.005	 0.004	
	 (0.041)	 (0.041)	 (0.053)	 (0.053)	
	
































































































































































































































































































































 Partial	 Partial	 Endorsement	 Additional	Government	
Country	 Cooperation	 Coordination	 Process	 Compliance	Guidance	
Argentina	 No	 No	 Yes	 No	
Australia	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Brazil	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Canada	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	
China	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
European	Union	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
France	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Germany	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
India	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 Yes	
Indonesia	 No	 No	 No	 No	
Italy	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Japan	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	
Korea	(South)	 No	 Yes	 No	 No	
Mexico	 No	 No	 No	 No	
Russia	 No	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
Saudi	Arabia	 No	 No	 No	 No	
South	Africa	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	
Turkey	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 No	
United	Kingdom	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	
United	States	 No	 No	 No	 No	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
59	This	table	is	similar	to	table	1.1	but	it	contains	an	additional	column	detailing	when	additional	
government	guidance	on	compliance	is	required	within	a	country.	The	data	is	from	Deloitte	
(current	as	of	2015)	using	my	definitions	of	partial	cooperation	and	coordination.	Additional	
government	compliance	means	in	addition	to	the	endorsement	process	there	is	a	second	
government	body	that	also	reviews	standards	and	issues	guidance	on	how	standards	should	be	
applied	(after	the	first	round	of	endorsement).	Since	the	US	agreement	has	yet	to	be	finalized,	
the	information	here	is	somewhat	different	than	the	information	about	the	US	in	the	case	study	
section.		
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Preventing	International	Compliance	with	Endorsement	Bodies	
	 Regulatory	compliance	can	be	viewed	as	a	two-part	political	process.	First,	when	new	
rules	are	developed	and	dictated	by	the	IASB	(EU	Regulator),	there	may	be	pressure	to	alter	the	
interpretation	and	date	of	implementation.	This	first	process	is	usually	determined	by	
endorsement	committees	(typically	a	country’s	private	regulator)	and	is	an	extremely	common	
tactic	for	noncompliance.	Second,	if	a	regulator	does	not	explicitly	state	noncompliance	in	the	
endorsement	process,	they	may	do	so	by	ignoring	noncompliant	practices	within	the	country.	
This	means	they	may	overlook	noncompliant	firm	practices	because	they	never	intended	to	
comply	with	the	rule,	or	as	a	means	of	temporarily	helping	firms	that	are	in	financial	trouble.		
	 While	partial	cooperation	(conceptualized	as	formal	rule	carve	outs)	tends	to	be	static	
and	carved	out	before	an	agreement,	compliance	is	dynamic	and	changing	with	the	needs	of	
firms	and	the	economy	after	the	agreement.	To	be	clear,	partial	cooperation	tends	to	occur	
when	countries	carve-out	large	rules	within	IFRS	after	an	agreement	via	legislation	(or	other	
channels).	Compliance	is	a	question	of	how	well	countries	adhere	to	the	constantly	changing	
rules	(i.e.	rule	updates)	from	the	IASB	(EU	regulator)	and	how	well	countries’	endorsement	
agencies	ensure60	firms	follow	rules.		
Unlike	international	law	or	other	agreements,	regulatory	standards	such	as	IFRS	are	
dynamic	and	sometimes	unpredictable.	Even	if	the	initial	standards	match	a	country’s	
preferences	or	conform	to	a	country’s	regulatory	status	quo	(i.e.	Drezner’s	theory	of	
international	regulatory	agreements),	the	rules	may	move	to	a	different	preference	point	years	
after.	To	protect	themselves	against	this,	more	than	half	of	all	countries	(See	Figure	4.2)	use	an	
																																																						
60	For	instance,	they	may	recommend	fines	for	failing	to	comply	with	new	rules.		
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endorsement	process	to	approve	any	changes	dictated	by	the	IASB	(EU	regulator).	In	most	
countries,	a	private	regulatory	body	is	exclusively	responsible	for	endorsement	except	in	the	
EU,	which	uses	the	EU	Commission61	(i.e.	a	government	body	to	police	its	private	regulator).		
	
	
	
The	countries	in	figure	4.262	that	forego	endorsement	may	still	not	fully	comply	with	
IFRS,	but	they	have	no	mechanism	for	rejecting	new	rules	or	interpreting	them	in	a	
noncompliant	way.	Countries	without	endorsement	may	fail	to	comply	due	to	a	lack	of	
																																																						
61	This	process	is	complex	within	the	EU	Commission.	There	are	several	committees	and	other	
bodies	that	review	these.	I	describe	this	more	in	the	EU	Case	study	in	this	chapter.		
62	The	primary	source	of	the	data	is	the	IASB’s	2015	World	Report.	This	report	describes	in	
detail	the	different	mechanisms	countries	use	for	endorsement	when	agreeing	to	use	IFRS.	
However,	there	are	some	gaps	in	this	data	and	those	gaps	are	filled	through	Deloite’s	IASBplus	
online	archive	that	speaks	to	endorsement	procedures	in	more	countries.	This	data	is	current	as	
of	2015	and	will	change	in	the	future.	Furthermore,	IFRS	only	permitted	describes	countries	
that	legally	permit	but	do	not	require	by	law	IFRS.	Required	by	some	firms	describes	countries	
that	legally	require	IFRS	for	some	sectors	of	their	economy.		
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resources	or	a	lack	of	expertise	and	understanding	of	the	implications	of	new	rules	issued	by	
the	IASB.	This	type	of	non-compliance	is	typically	not	intentional	whereas	the	endorsement	
mechanism	can	be	used	for	rule	specific	non-compliance.		
As	stated	previously,	the	two	tools	endorsers	have	for	noncompliance	with	IFRS	are:	(1)	
delayed	implementation,	and	(2)	differing	interpretations	of	new	rules.	The	first,	which	is	
employed	in	the	EU	frequently,	is	to	delay	new	rules	for	years	at	a	time.	When	new	rules	are	
delayed63	in	one	country	but	not	the	others,	the	comparability	of	cross	border	investments	is	
sometimes	lost.	This	can	occasionally	be	done	under	the	guise	of	“researching	the	impact	of	
new	standards”	or	to	delay	any	detrimental	economic	consequences	from	new	standards	until	
conditions	are	better.	For	example,	some	new	rules	were	delayed	for	Greece	during	the	EU	
financial	crisis,	and,	as	an	extreme	example,	Venezuela	has	not	endorsed	any	new	rules	or	
modifications	since	2003.	Other	countries’	private	endorsers	typically	delay	rules	by	a	year	at	
the	most,	but	can	delay	rules	indefinitely	if	they	choose.			
The	second	endorser	tool	is	to	interpret	new	rules	in	a	different	way	from	their	original	
intent.	For	example,	if	the	IASB	dictates	a	new	way	in	which	banks	must	value	an	asset,	the	
endorser	may	choose	to	interpret	or	codify	the	rule	in	a	way	that	is	inconsistent	with	the	IASB’s	
intent.	For	example,	in	2004,	the	EU	Commission	interpreted	rules	for	hedge	accounting	with	
European	banks	differently	by	ignoring	a	paragraph	of	a	new	standard.	Jordan’s	endorsement	
committee,	on	the	other	hand,	decided	in	2007	to	interpret	rules	for	property	valuations	
differently	“temporarily”	until	market	concerns	had	eased.64			
																																																						
63	The	literature	tends	to	refer	to	this	as	being	“out	of	sync.”		
64	This	“temporary”	interpretation	is	still	ongoing	as	of	2017.		
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Overlooking	Firm	Noncompliance		
	 Normally,	if	a	regulator	has	an	issue	with	compliance,	it	files	a	request	to	discuss	the	
problem	with	the	IFRS	interpretations	committee	(IFRIC),	but	sometimes	regulators	choose	to	
ignore	a	rule	instead.	Ignoring	a	rule	may	mean	asking	other	enforcement	agencies	to	forego	
fines	those	in	violation	or	issuing	guidance	on	a	rule	stating	it	is	not	necessary.	For	example,	
Brazil’s	private	regulatory	body,	which	has	its	leadership	appointed	by	the	Brazilian	President,	
rarely	asks	for	compliance	on	a	plethora	of	standards.	By	one	estimate	(Santos	2010),	over	55%	
of	Brazilian	firms	were	in	noncompliance	with	international	standards.	While	some	of	this	
noncompliance	was	due	to	the	CPC	(Brazilian	regulator)	interpreting	new	rules	differently,	the	
CPC	also	choose	to	ignore	several	new	rules	(Santos	2010).	Since	the	IASB	has	no	mechanism	
for	punishing	countries	that	fail	to	implement	new	rules,	the	CPC	can	endorse	all	rules,	claim	to	
follow	those	rules,	and	then	ignore	the	new	rules	it	endorses.		
	
Perverse	Incentives	and	the	Political	Cost	Theory	of	Accounting		
	 At	the	endorsement	stage	for	amending	IFRS	rules,	regulators	(i.e.	endorsers)	must	
consider	several	questions	before	they	accept	a	new	rule.	For	instance,	regulators	in	the	EU	
must	ask	the	following	questions:65		
1. Is	the	rule	favorable	to	the	“public	good”	in	Europe?	
2. Is	the	rule	consistent	with	the	“true	and	fair”	view	required	by	the	EU?	
3. Does	this	rule	create	the	financial	transparency	to	make	economic	decisions?	
																																																						
65	These	questions	are	from	the	influential	Maysadt	Report.	
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These	compliance	questions	are	not	concerned	about	compatibility	with	other	countries	(i.e.	
the	purpose	of	international	standards).	Instead,	regulatory	compliance	is	a	question	of	
national	interest66	or	what	is	beneficial	to	the	country	or	jurisdiction.		In	the	EU,	regulators	
depend	on	the	same	governments	for	funding	that	also	demand	rules	are	“favorable	to	the	
public	good	in	Europe.”	This	creates	perverse	incentives	for	noncompliance	and	is	compounded	
when	leaders	of	regulatory	bodies	are	appointed	by	government	officials	(e.g.	Brazil’s	CPC).		
	 Why	choose	noncompliance	if	cooperation	and	coordination	have	already	been	
decided?	Countries	could	choose	a	level	of	cooperation,	the	firms	to	use	those	standards,	and	
simply	comply	with	those	rules	and	their	future	iterations.	In	a	sense,	compliance	should	be	less	
of	a	problem	because	so	many	international	standards	are	already	carved=out	or	removed	from	
sections	of	a	country’s	economy.			
I	posit	purposeful	noncompliance	at	this	stage	is	directly	related	to	the	loss	of	
independence	by	regulators	(political	independence)	and	the	complete	divergence	of	goals	
between	governments	and	investors.	If	and	only	if	the	regulator’s	independence	is	
compromised,	then	can	governments	persuade	them	to	choose	noncompliance	over	complete	
transparency	and	international	comparability.	The	core	argument	of	this	chapter	concerning	
deviations	in	compliance	is	simply:	Governments	wish	for	financial	stability	while	investors	wish	
for	transparency,	but	governments	are	more	likely	to	manipulate	politically	dependent	
regulators.	The	implicit	hypothesis	of	this	chapter	I	demonstrate	in	the	case	study	section	is:	
H7:	In	difficult	economic	times,	governments	will	pursue	noncompliance	via	pressuring	politically	
dependent	regulators	to	ensure	financial	stability.	This	is	at	odds	with	the	regulators’	purpose	of	
ensuring	financial	transparency.		
																																																						
66	I	was	reluctant	to	use	this	phrase	here	as	it	can	be	defined	as	almost	anything.	However,	I	
broadly	mean	economic	advantage.		
	 103	
	
Within	the	history	of	standards,	the	pressures	for	noncompliance	have	stemmed	from	
two	events.	First,	noncompliance	can	be	a	short	term	and	temporary	response	to	economic	
shocks.		Second,	private	regulators,	such	as	the	CPC	with	politically	appointed	leaders,	may	use	
massive	low-level	noncompliance	to	discretely	mitigate	their	commitments	to	international	
agreements.	This	is	also	aided	by	the	fact	low-level	noncompliance	can	be	difficult	to	detect	and	
requires	well-funded	independent	studies	since	the	IASB	(or	other	international	agencies)	
currently	leave	compliance	strictly	to	national	regulators.		
	
A	Brief	Note	on	Small	Issues	of	Noncompliance		
For	the	purposes	of	this	project	and	other	related	research,	it	is	impossible	to	prove,	
without	enormous	funding,	that	regulators	are	pressured	into	mass	low-level	(i.e.	ignoring	small	
and	mostly	insignificant	deviations	from	rules)	noncompliance	during	normal	economic	times.	
To	produce	the	necessary	data,	it	would	require	hundreds	of	experts,	surveying	hundreds	of	
firms,	and	interviews	with	government	officials	and	regulators.	However,	I	believe	it	is	
necessary	to	acknowledge	it	as	a	possible	reason	and	mechanism	for	noncompliance	with	
international	regulatory	standards.				
Part	of	the	difficulty	in	assessing	the	magnitude	of	low-level	noncompliance	is,	unlike	
cooperation	and	coordination,	there	are	usually	no	official	declarations.	For	example,	since	the	
CPC	in	Brazil	would	not	share	its	compliance	data,	an	independent	team	of	auditors	used	the	
accepted	financial	statements	of	310	firms	in	Brazil	to	determine	compliance	rates.	Regulators	
may	also	interpret	a	new	rule	in	a	different	way	than	intended	while	petitioning	IFRIC	(IASB	
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interpretations	committee).	This	allows	over	a	year	of	noncompliance	with	less	reputation	costs	
given	the	regulator	can	claim	it	is	trying	to	adjudicate	their	differing	interpretations.	
	
Large	Scale	Noncompliance	as	a	Temporary	Solution	
As	I	demonstrate	in	the	case	study	section,	for	financial	regulations,	such	as	IFRS,	
noncompliance	can	be	a	temporary	response	to	economic	shocks	and	financial	instability.	This	
is	different	than	the	partial	cooperation	that	I	posit	occurs	during	crises	in	chapter	2.	Partial	
cooperation	during	crises	involves	legislating	entirely	new	rules	or	developing	a	second	set	of	
parallel	standards.	This	short-term	sets	of	rules	or	parallel	rule	development	in	crises	is	beyond	
the	scope	of	this	project.		
Non-compliance	during	crises,	on	the	other	hand,	stems	from	delaying	implementation	
of	rules	for	additional	years	or	accepting	the	rules	but	ignoring	them	on	a	massive	nation-wide	
scale.	During	the	EU	debt	crisis,	countries	such	as	France	and	Greece	asked	their	regulatory	
bodies	to	ignore	new	rules	for	6	to	7	years	and	to	use	previous	IFRS	rules	in	the	meantime.	
Complying	with	new	IFRS	rules	meant	some	additional	reporting	which	many,	like	Sarkozy,67	
believed	would	hurt	the	investment	prospects	on	the	aggregate	for	these	countries.		
Countries	like	Australia	and	New	Zealand	with	independent	regulators	are	inherently	
better	positioned	to	comply	with	international	regulation	during	crises	than	those	with	
politically	dependent	regulatory	bodies.	In	fact,	the	highest	level	compliance	countries	from	
																																																						
67	Here,	I’m	specifically	referring	to	when	Sarkozy	asked	that	mark	to	market	accounting	rules	
should	be	ignored	for	some	time	in	2008.	However,	Sarkozy	was	and	remains	an	opponent	of	
harmonizing	accounting	standards	from	a	cooperation,	coordination,	and	compliance	
standpoint.		
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figure	1.5	(Hungary,	New	Zealand,	UK,	and	Ireland)	have	independent	regulatory	bodies	to	
ensure	compliance.	Thus,	while	the	quantitative	data	is	insufficient	to	draw	wide-reaching	
conclusions,	independence	may	hinder	large	scale	noncompliance	during	crises	and	low	level	
regulatory	noncompliance	(i.e.	the	smaller	rules	that	are	not	enforced	during	normal	economic	
times).		
	
Political	Cost	Theory	of	Accounting	
Since	the	late	1970s,	finance	literature	has	recognized	there	is	a	relationship	between	
political	goals	and	regulatory	compliance	in	the	“political	cost”	theory	(Watts	&	Zimmerman	
1979).	This	theory	posits	that	compliance	with	regulatory	rules	(i.e.	the	country’s	private	
regulator)	is	largely	a	function	of	how	compliance	impacts	the	economy	(i.e.	government	
revenue)	and	regulators	are	wary	of	this	when	making	compliance	decisions.	With	a	negative	
economic	shock,	politicians	would	have	an	incentive	to	direct	regulatory	bodies	to	overlook	
noncompliance	if	it	would	cause	firms	harm	to	comply	or	impact	tax	revenue.	Most	literature	
examines	this	in	terms	of	domestic	tax	policy	and	overlooks	how	political	cost	may	influence	
international	compliance.	However,	the	core	tenant	of	political	cost	theory,	that	compliance	is	
driven	by	economic	concerns,	fits	well	with	my	theory	that	regulators	are	noncompliant	during	
challenging	economic	times.		
Finally,	from	a	policy	point	of	view,	the	problem	with	noncompliance	during	an	
economic	shock	is	the	enormous	long	term	harm	it	may	cause.	With	instability,	investors	and	
official	creditors	need	transparency	to	allocate	capital	efficiently.	In	the	short	run,	investors	
may	be	misled	by	noncompliance	and	in	the	long	run	the	economy	will	suffer.	Fortunately,	the	
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cases	of	extreme	noncompliance	have	only	occurred	in	the	largest	crises	and	from	private	
regulators	that	lack	independence.		
	
A	Brief	Note	on	International	Compliance	Data	
	 Briefly,	all	data	in	the	following	section,	unless	otherwise	noted,	comes	from	the	agency	
or	endorsement	board	located	within	the	country	of	question.	This	covers	standards	boards	
and	(when	separate	from	the	standards	board)	endorsement	agencies.	All	this	information	is	
publically	available	(e.g.	tens	of	thousands	of	pages	of	word	for	word	transcripts	of	meetings	
between	agencies	such	as	the	IASB	and	FASB	can	be	found	online).	Thus,	it	is	typically	easy	to	
discern	the	large	noncompliance	decisions	by	these	agencies.		
	 Given	the	limited	nature	of	international	compliance	data,	I	choose	to	examine	the	EU	
at	a	broad	level,	Greece	as	an	extension	of	the	EU	analysis,	the	US,	New	Zealand,	and	Canada.	
These	countries	have	the	most	transparent	data	available	concerning	compliance	and	their	
agencies	responsible	for	standards	and	(sometimes	a	separate	agency)	endorsement.	I	focus	on	
the	time	period	after	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.		
I	recognize	these	countries	were	not	all	impacted	the	same	from	the	2008	crisis.	
However,	even	when	EU	compliance	decisions	negatively	impacted	New	Zealand	and	Canada,	
these	countries	continued	with	strict	adherence	to	their	international	agreements.	Additionally,	
because	countries	like	Canada	and	New	Zealand	complied	without	incident,	there	is	less	to	say	
about	these	countries’	actions,	but	I	do	report	how	their	agencies	helped	promote	international	
compliance.		
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Finally,	since	finance	literature	recognized	compliance	decisions	as	political	as	early	as	
the	1970s	with	the	political	cost	theory	of	accounting,	there	is	less	of	a	need	to	establish	the	
process	is	politicized.	Additionally,	political	scientist	such	as	Art	et	al	2014	have	discussed	how	
IFRS	noncompliance	increases	during	elections.	Thus,	the	goal	in	the	following	section	is	to	
demonstrate	boards	that	are	politically	dependent68	are	more	prone	to	push	for	stability	over	
transparency	in	the	short	run	(though	in	the	long	run	these	are	likely	related).	
	
Compliance	in	the	EU,	Greece,	US,	New	Zealand,	and	Canada						
	 In	a	2011	letter	to	the	European	Securities	and	Markets	Authority	(ESMA)	regarding	
Greece’s	noncompliance,	Hans	Hoogervorst,	president	of	the	IASB,	stated	“We	are	aware	that,	
as	an	accounting	standard-setter,	the	IASB	does	not	have	the	authority	to	ensure	compliance	
with	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards.”	In	this	brief	section	that	follows	this	small	
introduction,	I	discuss	some	of	the	reasons	Hoogervorst	expressed	concerns	about	the	EU	and	
Greece	to	the	ESMA.	In	part,	his	letter	was	in	response	to	several	actions	taken	by	the	EU	
Commission	to	change	the	IASB	and	mitigate	its	rules	for	countries	such	as	Greece.			
	Within	the	EU	and	Greece,	the	road	to	noncompliance	with	international	regulatory	
agreements	began	before	the	EU’s	legal	adoption	of	IFRS	in	2003	(Council	Regulation	1606).	The	
initial	regulatory	law	passed	in	the	EU,	in	addition	to	carving	out	some	rules	(i.e.	partial	
																																																						
68	Standards	boards	or	endorsement	agencies	that	have	a	leader	appointed	by	a	government	
official	or	have	their	decisions	tied	to	a	vote	from	another	political	institution.	This	may	also	
take	the	form	of	a	government	funding	the	agency	and	threatening	those	funds.	These	three	
ways	to	political	dependence	may	not	all	yield	the	same	result,	but	in	this	section	I	try	to	
demonstrate	how	they	have.	The	results	may	be	different	in	other	countries	however	there	is	
limited	compliance	data	globally.		
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cooperation)	also	accepted,	but	delayed,	other	rules	for	years.	The	regulatory	law	set	the	
conditions	for	noncompliance	such	as	rejecting	future	rules	(through	non	endorsement)	that	
the	EU	perceived	as	hurtful	to	its	economy.			
Shortly	after,	Greece,	like	other	countries	in	the	EU	in	2005,		had	a	level	of	compliance	
that	was	similar	to	the	rest	of	the	world	or	better	at	80%69	(Tsalavoutas	2009).	Following	the	
2008	crisis,	this	level	dipped	as	low	as	50%	and	by	2014	was	still	one	of	the	lowest	rates70	in	the	
world.	These	low	international	compliance	rates	occurred	with	unprecedented	delays	in	
implementing	new	international	rules.	Greece’s	compliance	problem	was	only	possible71	
because	of	a	lack	political	independence	in	its	rulemaking	bodies	and	those	that	ensure	
compliance	such	as	the	Hellenic	Accounting	and	Auditing	Standards	Oversight	Board	(HAASOB).		
Greek	legislation	also	interfered	with	compliance	by	allowing	firms	to	apply	rules	
differently	(Ballas	et.	al	2015).	Additionally,	EU	regulatory	bodies	and	the	Greek	Government	
used	noncompliance	with	the	goal	of	helping	the	Greek	economy	and	Greece’s	credit	rating	
(Gebhardt	2016).	Before	the	efforts	of	the	EU	and	Greek	Law	makers,	the	IASB	rules	dictated	
																																																						
69	The	standard	deviation	was	about	7%.		
70	Out	of	the	countries	with	data.	It’s	possible	Greece	may	be	relatively	more	compliant	than	
most	of	the	world,	but	it	is	difficult	to	discern	given	compliance	rate	data	only	exists	for	30	or	so	
countries.		
71	In	terms	of	the	counterfactual	here,	the	EU	is	a	really	bazaar	place	for	compliance	because	
supranational	bodies	and	country	level	bodies	are	responsible	for	compliance.	However,	
unequivocally,	at	the	supranational	level	much	of	Greece’s	noncompliance	stemmed	directly	
from	the	EU	Commission.	Within	the	EU	Commission	talks,	as	documented	by	Zeff	and	
Camferman	2015,	the	EU	Commission	only	made	noncompliance	changes	after	clearing	them	
with	other	countries	both	within	the	EU	and	outside	of	the	EU.	It	is	unlikely	Greece	could	have	
accomplished	this	by	itself.	For	example,	German	officials	had	to	be	consulted	when	the	value	
of	Greek	debts	within	their	banks	were	downgraded	(via	noncompliance).		
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Greek	banks	had	to	report	at	least	50%	of	their	losses.	However,	through	noncompliance	some	
firms	reported	only	21%	losses	on	their	debts.72		
Within	Greece	and	the	EU	noncompliance	was	achieved	mainly	by	delayed	
implementation	of	several	IFRS	rules	and	the	reinterpretation	of	rules.	This	was	done	both	at	a	
national	level	by	private	bodies	in	Greece	at	the	request	of	government	officials	and	at	the	
supranational	level	within	the	EU	(e.g.	the	EU	Commission).	It	also	impacted	enforcement	by	
supranational	entities	such	as	the	ESMA	and	national	entities	such	as	the	Hellenic	Capital	
Market	Commission	(HCMC)	in	Greece.		
	
The	EU’s	Reinterpretation	of	IAS	39	and	IFRS	7	
Alone,	Greece’s	issues	did	not	motivate	the	EU	to	move	toward	noncompliance.	Greece	
is	only	one	small	part	of	the	EU’s	noncompliance	story.	The	EU’s	history	of	noncompliance	
began	shortly	after	its	legal	adoption	of	IFRS	and	in	the	face	of	several	rule	carve-outs	(partial	
cooperation)	and	firm	exemptions	(partial	coordination).	To	protect	itself	from	future	rule	
changes	with	the	IASB,	the	EU	Commission73	was	given	the	power	of	endorsement	that	allowed	
it:	to	delay	new	rules,	reinterpret	current	and	new	rules,	and	block	new	rules.	Endorsement	
bodies	are	common	in	conjunction	with	a	private	standard	setter,	but	the	EU	Commission	is	
unique	in	this	task	because	it	represents	an	enormous	market,	it	funds	the	IASB,	and	it	is	
responsible	for	more	than	one	country.		
																																																						
72	Specifically,	Greek	government	debt.		
73	As	of	2017,	this	power	still	broadly	rests	with	the	EU	Commission,	but	there	are	several	
government	bodies	within	the	EU	battling	to	be	the	endorsement	body.		
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Immediately	after	the	legal	adoption	of	IFRS,	the	EU	Commission	decided	to	keep	IAS	
39,	a	rule	concerned	with	financial	derivatives	(futures,	options,	etc.),	but	to	interpret	it	
differently.74	This	2004	reinterpretation	failed	to	comply	with	the	goals	of	IAS	39	as	issued	by	
the	IASB	(EU	regulator).	It	was	a	case	of	stability75	over	transparency.		In	light	of	these	changes,	
Dimitris	Chorafas,	an	IFRS	expert,	noted:		
	 “If	many	companies	and	some	heads	of	EU	governments	are	uncomfortable	with	the	
way	IAS	39	makes	hedges	transparent,	it	is	because	they	have	things	to	keep	out	of	
public	view.	By	correctly	obliging	them	to	show	the	value	of	instruments	they	use	(i.e.	
bonds),	IFRS	renders	every	stakeholder	a	great	service…If	you	let	a	company	[or	
government]	choose	its	accounting	system,	it	can	prove	anything	it	likes.”		
	 The	overall	impact	of	the	reinterpretation	was	small	within	the	EU	economy	compared	
to	the	2008	reinterpretation.	The	2008	reinterpretation	allowed	EU	banks	to	report	losses	on	
bonds	from	governments	(such	as	Greece)	as	a	fraction	of	what	the	costs	were	valued	at	under	
the	previous	interpretation.	The	impetus	for	this	reinterpretation	was	a	perceived	advantage	
US	banks	had	over	their	EU	counterparts	at	the	start	of	the	financial	crisis.		
This	perceived	fear	drove	Sarkozy	and	finance	ministers	at	a	2008	European	and	
Financial	Affairs	Council	(ECOFIN)	to	demand	immediate	changes	by	the	IASB.	These	changes	
were	on	top	of	the	rule	interpretation	changes	already	implemented	by	the	EU	Commission.	At	
																																																						
74	The	EU	Commission	stated	“in	particular,	the	amended	standard	is	not	contrary	to	the	
principal	of	providing	a	“true	and	fair	view”	of	a	company	and	is	conducive	to	the	European	
public	good.	Whereas	the	fair	value	option	under	the	original	standard	was	unrestricted…”	The	
Implication	here	was	the	old	standard,	before	the	EU	Commission	changed	the	interpretation,	
was	not	good	for	the	EU	public	good.		
75	Sarkozy	made	the	comment	about	stability	in	a	2004	speech	as	Minister	of	Finance.		
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the	same	time,	the	ESMA	at	the	EU	commissions’	request,	stopped	punishing	firms	and	banks	
within	the	EU	that	underreported	losses	from	government	bonds	(Gebhardt	2016).		
	 In	the	lead	up	to	reinterpretations	in	2008,	meetings	between	the	EU	Commission	and	
the	IASB	were	very	tense	(Camfferman	&	Zeff	2015).	As	Sarkozy	and	EU	finance	ministers	
threatened	to	use	legislation	to	reinterpret	rules	if	the	IASB	did	not,	the	IASB	executive	
chairman,	David	Tweedie,	communicated	with	the	SEC	on	possible	changes	to	IFRS.	The	IASB	
wanted	the	US	to	fully	cooperate	(in	the	future	at	a	minimum)	and	was	fearful	too	much	change	
would	stop	the	US	process	of	adoption.	The	SEC	warned	large	carve-outs	to	IAS	39	and	IFRS	7,	
which	would	both	make	banking	debt	less	significant	in	the	EU,	would	harm	any	future	US	
involvement	in	IFRS.		
	 Despite	warnings	from	the	David	Tweedie,	the	pressure	was	too	great	from	Britain,	
France,	ECOFIN,	and	the	EU	Commission.	In	October	of	2008,	the	IASB	had	perverse	incentives	
to	regulate	differently,	and	the	board’s	membership	was	fearful	of	losing	the	EU	market	
entirely.	Finally,	the	IASB	reinterpreted	IFRS	7	and	IAS	39.	However,	these	changes	were	not	
everything	the	EU	Commission	and	Parliament	and	EU	Commission	demanded.	
	At	a	press	conference	later	in	October	2008,	Sarkozy	stated	the	handicap	hurting	EU	
firms	had	finally	been	removed,	and	thanked	Gordon	Brown	(the	then	UK	Prime	Minister)	for	
his	support.	This	“handicap”	removed	meant	less	transparency	in	banking	debts	for	greater	
stability	in	the	EU.	Following	the	threats	of	noncompliance,	the	EU	Commission	took	several	
steps	of	direct	noncompliance.		
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EU:	Delay,	Threatening	Funds,	and	Failure	to	Enforce		
	 Beyond	the	reinterpretation	of	international	rules,	the	EU	Commission	took	three	
actions	to	skirt	compliance	and	to	create	seemingly	better	financial	reports	from	EU	countries	
(with	a	focus	on	Greece):	(1)	the	delay	of	new	rules	by	almost	a	decade,	(2)	the	threatening	of	
withdrawing	funds	from	private	regulators,	and	(3)	directing	enforcement	agencies	to	overlook	
noncompliance.	The	delay	of	new	rules	occurred	almost	immediately	after	the	financial	crisis	
(until	2018)	as	did	the	lack	of	enforcement	by	bodies	such	as	the	ESMA.	However,	it	was	not	
until	a	year	after	the	crisis	that	the	EU	Parliament	threatened	the	IASB’s	funding.		
	 To	correct	issues	of	noncompliance,	the	IASB	proposed	to	the	EU	Commission76	a	new	
rule	that	they	believed	the	EU	and	other	countries	could	comply	with	it:	International	
Accounting	Rule	9	(IAS	9).	Despite	its	proposal	immediately	after	the	financial	crisis	and	the	EU	
Commission’s	statement	that	all	rules	should	be	endorsed	within	8-12	months,	the	EU	
Commission	stopped	the	IASB	from	passing	the	rule	until	November	2016.	Furthermore,	this	
rule	will	not	be	legally	required	for	firms	within	the	EU	until	2018	(some	firms	will	have	until	
2020	though).	Thus,	the	EU	Commission	was	able	to	delay	compliance	with	a	rule	for	almost	ten	
years.		
	 Why	was	the	delay	of	IAS	9	so	important?	IAS	9’s	purpose	was	to	replace	a	previous	rule	
(IAS	39)	that	the	EU	Commission	continuously	reinterpreted77	in	ways	that	was	advantageous	to	
EU	firms.	With	IAS	9,	the	EU	Commission’s	noncompliance	would	be	even	greater	than	before,	
																																																						
76	Technically	all	rules	are	examined	by	the	EU	parliament	and	Council	first,	but	the	EU	
Commission	has	the	final	say.	As	noted	elsewhere	in	this	dissertation,	the	EU	parliament	is	
currently	fighting	for	the	EU	Commission’s	power	to	approve	or	deny	new	rules	and	the	power	
of	interpretation.			
77	This	is	in	reference	to	using	vague	definitions	in	IAS	39,	in	ways	not	intended,	to	hide	debt.		
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and	vague	language,	which	the	EU	used	to	skirt	compliance,	was	eliminated	in	IAS	9.	Delaying	
the	rule	by	10	years	allowed	the	EU	to	weather	its	financial	crisis	in	its	own	way.	Furthermore,	it	
avoided	the	reputation	costs	of	promoting	IFRS	to	other	countries	(usually	via	the	IMF)	while	in	
a	state	of	greater	noncompliance	(as	would	have	been	the	case	with	IAS	9).		
	 Political	and	financial	dependence	of	standard	setters	can	also	be	used	to	further	
noncompliance	with	international	regulatory	agreements.	In	201078	the	EU	Commission	
threatened	to	withhold	funds	(£7.9	million)	from	the	IASB	when	discussions	broke	down	
regarding	compliance	with	IASB	39	and	the	development	of	IASB	9.	In	addition	to	potentially	
withholding	funds,	the	EU	Parliament	stated	it	would	review	its	funding	of	the	IASB	on	an	
annual	basis.	At	the	time,	Hans	Hoogervorst	called	the	move	“a	threat	to	our	independence”	
and	“totally	unacceptable”.	This	was	followed	by	several	additional	moves	to	withhold	funding	
from	the	IASB	in	order	to	tailor	rules	around	the	EU’s	needs.	For	example,	in	2014	the	EU	
parliament	agreed	to	funding	of	£43	million	but	with	strings	attached	that	forced	the	IASB	to	
allow	interpretations	of	rules	the	EU	Commission	prefers.	The	threats	to	funding	allowed	the	EU	
to	avoid	compliance	and,	after	10	years,	warp	some	of	the	rules	within	the	IASB	to	be	more	
favorable	to	the	EU.	
	 At	the	supranational	level	agencies	were	directed	to	ignore	purposeful	noncompliance	
with	IASB	rules	that	may	hurt	EU	firms.	In	2011,	the	EU	Commission	directed	the	ESMA	to	give	
“special	consideration”	to	firms	suffering	from	bond	losses	after	the	financial	crisis.	In	effect,	
																																																						
78	The	threats	to	funding,	which	started	in	2010	with	statements	from	E.U.	internal	market	
commissioner	Michel	Barnier	were	reported	initially	by	the	Financial	Times	but	were	also	
reported	as	early	as	2009	by	Zeff	&	Camfferman	(2015):	http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8fc6ab2e-
404a-11df-8d23-00144feabdc0.html	
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this	meant	firms	did	not	need	to	comply	with	international	standards	since	there	the	EU	would	
not	enforce	the	IASB’s	interpretation.	This	was	especially	visible	in	Greece79	with	the	ESMA	
avoiding	penalizing	actions	(i.e.	fines)	against	firms	and	instead	advising	firms	how	they	may	
comply	better	with	international	rules.	In	the	years	following	the	crisis,	enforcement	actions	
across	the	EU	dropped	by	33%80	for	all	international	accounting	laws	(Maloney	2014).			
	 With	a	lack	of	supranational	enforcement	of	international	rules,	individual	countries’	
enforcement	agencies,	which	report	to	the	ESMA	in	the	EU,	had	to	decide	what	levels	of	
compliance	were	good	enough.	Some	countries	in	the	EU,	such	as	Finland,	with	independent	
private	standard	setters	and	enforcement	agencies	maintained	high	levels	of	compliance	and	
zero	interference	from	their	respective	governments.	Other	countries,	such	as	Greece,	used	
government	institutions	to	avoid	compliance	with	international	regulatory	law.		
For	example,	in	2010	to	help	mitigate	its	economic	crisis,	the	Greek	government	created	
the	Hellenic	Financial	Stability	Fund	(HFSF)	as	a	private	entity	separate	from	the	government.	
This	legal	entity’s	purpose	was	to	manage	banks	with	nonperforming	loans	(i.e.	defaulted	
debts)	and	to	provide	capital	when	necessary.	However,	while	the	HFSF	is	an	independent	
organization,	the	law	that	created	and	governs	its	actions	explicitly	is	in	noncompliance	with	
international	financial	law.	For	example,	in	its	August	2013	report	about	its	use	of	IFRS,	the	
HFSF	noted	the	financial	rules	that	govern	it	used	old	interpretations	of	IFRS	(from	2009).	
																																																						
79	The	ESMA	did	not	officially	form	until	2011.	Most	sources,	including	the	ESMA	reports,	put	
their	enforcement	actions	in	these	early	years	around	30	for	the	entire	EU	with	4	or	5	cases	
with	some	actual	legal	action	taken.	While	some	Greek	firms	likely	suffered	from	the	ESMA	
after	the	crisis,	none	of	them	suffered	from	the	IASB	39	rules	even	if	they	were	not	in	
compliance	due	to	“special	consideration”.	This	is	the	main	point	that	is	important	here.		
80	This	number	comes	from	a	joint	CESR	and	ESMA	Report.		
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Additionally,	the	HFSF	used	the	same	noncompliant	interpretations	of	regulatory	rules	as	the	
EU	Commission	despite	opposition	from	the	IASB.		
	
The	US	Path	toward	Compliance	and	“Condorsement”		
	 In	2002,	the	US	standard	setter	(FASB)	committed	to	eventually	use	(cooperate)	and	
comply	with	IFRS	via	the	Norwalk	agreement	with	the	IASB.	This	was	during	a	time	when	US	
financial	trust	had	deteriorated	due	to	accounting	scandals.	The	FASB	most	likely	choose	IFRS	
since	US	had	lost	substantial	influence	on	standards.	For	example,	New	Zealand	and	Australia	
stated	in	a	joint	government	report	that	their	move	to	IFRS	in	2005	was	motivated	by	Enron	and	
Worldcomm	scandals	in	the	US.	This	lead	to	the	FASB,	likely	believing	the	US	would	not	be	the	
leader	in	financial	rules,	signing	the	Norwalk	agreement.	In	this	way,	the	US	would	at	least	have	
some	voice	in	the	future	of	the	IASB	(and	in	effect	international	rule	making).		
	 In	the	years	and	meetings	after,	the	FASB	with	the	IASB	developed	a	path	that	would	
allow	the	US	to	both	adopt	and	comply	with	international	standards	(i.e.	IFRS)	and	slowly	
cooperate	with	all	rules.81	In	the	initial	iterations	of	the	FASB’s	plans	with	the	IASB,	
endorsement	as	a	mechanism	to	delay	rules	or	reinterpret	them	was	considered	(similar	to	the	
EU’s	endorsement	mechanism).	Plans	changed	slightly	with	the	passage	of	the	Emergency	
Economic	Stabilization	Act	in	2007.	This	act	gave	the	SEC	the	power	to	stop	convergence	and	
coined	a	new	term	for	future	cooperation	and	compliance	called	“condorsement”.		
																																																						
81	For	the	sanity	of	the	reader,	I	have	omitted	the	technical	details	here	and	I	have	little	interest	
in	discussing	them	because	they	do	not	add	to	the	political	discussion.	However,	for	those	
interested	at	a	technical	level	what	compliance	would	look	like	for	the	US,	there	are	thousands	
of	pages	of	transcripts	from	the	2002-2008	meetings	between	the	IASB	and	FASB	on	the	FASB’s	
website.		
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	 Condorsement,	a	term	invented	in	2010	by	SEC	Deputy	Chief	Accountant	Paul	Beswick,	
describes	the	SEC	policy	that	instead	of	simply	implementing	rules	and	changes	in	a	timely	
fashion	in	conjunction	with	the	IASB,	the	FASB	would	endorse	(interpret,	delay,	and	choose	
compliance)	and	also	maintain	an	entirely	separate	set	of	US	standards	US	firms	could	use.	This	
is	more	than	just	rule	carves-outs	(partial	cooperation)	or	different	rules	for	some	firms	or	
sectors,	but	instead	an	entirely	parallel	set	of	rules	for	firms	anywhere	in	the	US.	In	the	long	
run,	the	FASB	would	make	US	rules	slowly	converge	to	IFRS	despite	numerous	areas	that	are	
discontinuous	and	difficult	to	adjudicate.		
	 While	the	US	was	not	actively	requiring	IFRS	for	firms	during	this	time,	many	firms	in	the	
US	are	permitted	to	file	separate	reports	using	international	rules.	Thus,	because	of	changes	by	
US	congress	and	modifications	to	the	FASB’s	plans	by	the	SEC,	the	FASB	could	no	longer	comply	
with	international	regulatory	agreements	in	a	way	it	desired.	Instead,	US	actions	opened	the	
door	for	each	rule	to	reinterpreted,	delayed,	or	rejected.	Condorsement	may	protect	
sovereignty	but	it	defeats	the	purpose	of	international	regulatory	agreements	and	renders	
them	less	useful.		
	
New	Zealand,	Canada,	and	Independent	Rulemakers	
	 Although	New	Zealand’s	compliance	with	international	regulatory	agreements	is	not	
perfect,	it	has	one	of	the	highest	IFRS	compliance	rates	in	the	world.	In	part,	this	is	because	
compliance	with	international	accounting	rules	and	their	implementation	is	the	responsibility	of	
an	independent	body.	Furthermore,	this	independence	is	codified	into	New	Zealand	law		
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(Financial	Reporting	Act	of	201182	and	the	former	Financial	Reporting	Act	of	1993).	In	fact,	IFRS	
rules	become	law	almost	immediately	even	if	the	New	Zealand	Parliament	subsequently	
disallows	them	(Cammfermann	&	Zeff	2015).	New	Zealand’s	two	accounting	laws	work	together	
to	allow	its	independent	External	Reporting	Board	to	make	IASB	rules	and	amendments	into	law	
as	soon	as	they	are	announced.		
	 Unlike	the	political	endorsement	boards	in	the	EU	or	the	US,	New	Zealand’s	board	
consists	of	accountants	and	has	international	cooperation	as	a	chief	goal.	For	example,	the	EU	
Commission	must	consider	how	each	rule	helps	EU	countries	before	deciding	to	endorse	it,	
reinterpret	it,	or	reject	it.	New	Zealand,	on	the	other	hand,	pursues	a	strategy	of	working	the	
with	IASB	in	formal	meetings	to	promote	new	IFRS	rules	that	are	in	the	best	interest	of	New	
Zealand.	This	cooperation	takes	place	among	technical	experts	and	not	politically	appointed	
members.		
	 Free	from	political	interference	with	international	rules,	firms	in	New	Zealand	have	an	
advantage	with	compliance.	New	Zealand	and	in	other	countries	with	independent	standards	
boards83	can	be	certain	of	how	future	regulation	and	the	compliance	requirements	since	there	
is	less	chance	of	legislative	acts	or	threats	to	agency	funding	that	will	alter	accounting	rules	and	
compliance	expectations.	In	contrast,	in	the	EU,	after	the	EU	Commission	takes	an	endorsement	
action,	compliance	decisions,	for	the	most	part,	are	in	the	hands	of	individual	countries’	
																																																						
82	In	Cammfferman	&	Zeff’s	(2015)	research	they	state	this	law	passed	in	2011.	However,	the	
External	Reporting	Board	(in	New	Zealand)	cites	the	2013	law.		
83	Or	endorsement	committees.	They	tend	to	be	tied	to	each	other	except	in	the	EU	where	the	
endorsement	board	is	explicitly	the	EU	Commission,	but	countries	also	have	their	own	
accounting	standards	boards	as	well	and	enforcement	agencies.		
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standards	boards	or	agencies.		This	adds	complexity	to	compliance	with	international	financial	
agreements	that	New	Zealand	is	able	to	avoid.		
	 Similarly,	Canada’s	standard	setting	board	(AcSB),	which	is	responsible	for	endorsement	
of	new	international	rules,	is	completely	independent	of	government.	It	voluntarily	has	a	few	
former	members	of	government	on	its	oversight	committee,	but	otherwise	consists	of	experts	
working	with	the	IASB.	Although	Canada’s	complete	compliance	rate	is	unknown,	the	country	
was	free	from	large	compliance	issues	with	the	IASB	(during	its	negotiation	process	and	gradual	
adoption	of	IFRS).	Furthermore,	firms	are	able	to	write	on	their	reports	“IFRS	as	understood	as	
the	IASB”	because	the	Canada	standard	setter	has	faith	in	its	ability	to	comply	with	current	and	
future	international	regulations.				
	 In	part,	Canada’s	AcSB	may	have	had	more	success	in	international	compliance	because	
its	agreement	with	the	IASB	completed	circumvented	any	government	oversight.	For	example,	
as	part	of	its	agreement84	with	the	IASB,	the	AcSB	provides	feedback	as	new	international	rules	
are	developed	and	provides	technical	expertise.	This	is	in	contrast	to	other	countries	or	
endorsement	committees	such	as	the	EU	Commission	that	try	to	influence	the	IASB’s	
international	regulations	through	delays,	funding	threats,	and	other	avenues	of	political	
pressure.			
	 This	independence	avoided	the	compliance	issues	present	during	the	US	and	EU’s	
“accounting	standards	war”	that	followed	2008.	Rather	than	fight	the	IASB	or	look	for	short-
																																																						
84	Here	I	am	referring	to	the	2006	Best	Practice:	Working	Relationships	between	the	IASB	Board	
and	other	Accounting	Standard-Setters.	The	IASB’s	Canada	report	2015	emphasizes	this	
working	relationship.	 
	
	 119	
term	gains,	these	agencies	worked	with	the	IASB	to	avoid	compliance	issues.	Furthermore,	by	
avoiding	obfuscation	of	standards	through	compliance,	these	regulators	were	able	to	maintain	
transparency.		
	
Stability	Over	Transparency		
	 Within	these	cases,	the	countries	with	political	control	over	their	standards	boards	were	
able	to	bend	compliance	for	more	opaque	financial	reporting.	The	actions	hindering	compliance	
were	done	purposely	in	the	name	of	stability.	Noncompliance	for	stability	was	an	issue	as	early	
as	2004	when	Sarkozy	(then	Minister	of	Finance)	stated	changing	IFRS	would	stabilize	the	EU	
economy.	Similarly,	the	SEC’s	actions	in	the	US	hurt	prospects	for	both	compliance	and	
cooperation	on	international	rules	after	the	financial	crisis.	Until	2008,	the	US	standards	board	
(and	future	endorsement	board)	were	politically	independent	and	received	their	funding	from	
nongovernmental	sources.				
	 Implicitly	in	this	chapter,	and	as	stated	by	Hans	Hoogervorst,	the	existence	of	an	
endorsement	body	also	signals	that	countries	are	concerned	about	their	sovereignty	regarding	
transparency	of	their	domestic	firms.	New	Zealand,	Canada,	the	US,	and	EU	all	have	
endorsement	committees	so	there	must	be	some	concern	over	future	rules	from	the	IASB.	
Despite	sovereignty	issues,	New	Zealand	and	Canada	are	confident	enough	to	leave	the	
compliance	process	in	private	hands.	All	four	countries	have	a	long	history	of	standards	boards	
and	development,	yet	the	US	and	EU	do	no	trust	private	bodies	to	act	in	their	national	interest.		
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In	the	context	of	Cooperation	and	Coordination	
	 The	decisions	within	Canada	and	New	Zealand	to	maintain	the	political	independence	of	
compliance	bodies	were	not	in	a	vacuum.		New	Zealand	has	a	small	level	of	partial	cooperation	
while	Canada	has	a	small	level	of	partial	cooperation.	These	countries	both	locked	in	their	
disagreements	with	the	IASB	at	the	inception	of	IFRS	and	in	turn	there	was	less	need	for	
government	intervention	via	compliance.	This	has	most	likely	aided	the	independence	of	
endorsement	bodies	in	Canada	and	New	Zealand.	
	 Early	cooperation	and	coordination	carve-outs	do	not	necessarily	mean	a	country	will	
have	politically	independent	endorsement	boards	(chapter	5	discusses	this	topic	more	
thoroughly).	These	early	carve-outs	may	create	less	of	a	need	for	endorsement	boards	and	less	
extreme	partial	cooperation	or	coordination.	Noncompliance	is,	in	most	instances,	more	useful	
as	a	tool	for	regulators	and	governments	that	need	a	short	term	solution	to	stability	at	the	
expense	of	an	IFRS	rule	(i.e.	transparency).		
The	EU	Commission	carved-out	rules	initially	with	the	passing	of	the	IFRS	regulatory	law	
in	Europe	(coordination	carve-outs	happened	at	the	same	time	but	mostly	on	a	country	to	
country	basis	in	the	EU).	The	question	that	must	be	asked	is	how	much	would	noncompliance	
increase	if	these	early	cooperation	and	coordination	carve-outs	did	not	occur.	The	EU	
Commission	clearly	anticipated	the	IASB	would	move	from	the	Commission’s	preference	point	
and	safeguarded	against	it	by	giving	the	Commission	endorsement	power.	The	more	extreme	
measures,	such	as	threatening	the	IASB’s	funding,	may	indicate	the	EU	Commission	did	not	
anticipate	that	the	preference	point	between	the	Commission	and	the	IASB	would	diverge	as	
much	as	it	did	during	the	financial	crisis.		
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	 The	US,	with	the	intervention	of	the	SEC,	took	the	unprecedented	route	of	creating	
“condorsement”	so	cooperation	and	compliance	could	be	manipulated	at	any	time.	Under	this	
system,	compliance	with	IFRS	and	rule	carve-outs	can	quickly	change.	This	means	initial	level	of	
cooperation	will	no	longer	be	viewed	as	sticky	if	the	SEC	commission’s	condorsement	body	
makes	rapid	changes	(which	they	will	have	the	power	to	do).	The	US	path	may	be	a	product	of	
watching	the	EU	Commission	struggle	with	maintaining	control	over	its	standards	through	
mostly	short-term	measures	of	noncompliance.		
	
Political	Endorsement	and	Standards	Boards		
	 Political	endorsement	committees	or	standards	boards	are	necessary	for	the	failure	of	
international	compliance,	but	not	sufficient	in	themselves.	Some	pressure	to	reinterpret	the	
rules	in	a	more	favorable	way	must	come	from	a	domestic	audience,	and	this	is	more	likely	to	
occur	during	times	of	extraordinary	need	(i.e.	economic	crises).	When	compliance	is	in	the	
hands	of	political	bodies,	domestic	pressure	can	be	channeled	in	a	way	that	international	
agreements	(of	a	regulatory	nature)	are	less	meaningful.	This	should	also	be		true	for	other	
international	regulatory	agreements	such	as	the	Basil	Accords,	which	include	international	
accounting	standards,	and	other	non-financial	regulatory	agreements	such	as	internet	rules	in	
the	World	Wide	Web	Consortium	(W3C).		
	 Within	the	political	science	literature,	this	complements	Alt	et	al.	(2014)	by	
demonstrating	noncompliance	is	not	simply	about	election	cycles	and	that	the	national	
standards	or	endorsement	body	heavily	influences	international	compliance.	This	means	the	
analysis	of	international	compliance	around	elections	may	benefit	greatly	by	taking	into	
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account	if	a	political	body	is	responsible	for	compliance	or	is	the	agency	independent	and	full	of	
technical	experts.		
	 In	regards	to	Drezner’s	(2007)	work	on	international	regulatory	compliance,	the	
evidence	in	this	chapter	directly	contradicts	his	theory	that	countries	pursue	regulatory	
agreements	that	reflect	their	regulatory	status	quo.	Endorsement	agencies	and	political	
standards	boards	are	responsible	for	shifting	international	agreements	when	they	are	not	
favorable	to	a	country’s	current	political	environment.	The	technical	expertise	for	regulation	
makes	understanding	the	status	quo,	especially	by	political	leaders,	difficult.	This	chapter	only	
covers	a	subsection	of	international	regulatory	agreements	(financial	ones),	and	the	evidence	in	
these	cases	unequivocally	demonstrates	international	regulation	is	often	adopted	when	its	far	
outside	the	status	quo.	This	is	also	the	case	for	more	powerful	countries	such	as	the	US	or	EU.		
	 Authorities	in	the	EU	and	US	may	believe	there	is	too	much	power	in	a	private	
organization	that	decides	how	their	firms	should	disclose	financial	information.	Controlling	
which	rules	are	agreed	to	and	where	they	apply,	may	not	be	enough	for	countries	with	large	
capital	markets	or	countries	that	are	more	susceptible	to	economic	shocks.	It	is	possible	
countries	like	New	Zealand	and	Canada	leave	compliance	to	independent	agencies	because	
they	have	less	to	lose	in	a	crisis.	However,	these	countries	still	maintain	an	endorsement	
process	to	filter	new	rules,	unlike	some	countries	(mostly	in	South	America	and	Africa)	with	no	
endorsement	body.	Thus,	it	is	also	possible	New	Zealand	and	Canada	believe	their	independent	
agencies	will	act	in	their	best	interest.		
	 Like	all	international	regulatory	law	or	agreements,	IFRS	needs	industry	and	technical	
experts	to	put	it	into	action	and	ensure	compliance,	and	these	experts’	function	cannot	be	
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easily	replaced	by	political	boards	with	short	term	economic	goals	(i.e.	stability).	Additionally,	
every	country	has	slightly	different	bodies	that	are	responsible	for	endorsement	and	standards,	
but	in	most	cases	it	is	easy	to	recognize	when	a	board	or	committee	is	an	extension	of	domestic	
politics.	This	may	be	more	obvious	in	countries	like	Brazil	when	the	country’s	president	
appoints	the	head	of	the	compliance	body	or	in	the	EU	(because	the	EU	Commission	is	also	the	
endorsement	body).	Political	boards	typically	have	less	experts	with	backgrounds	in	finance	or	
accounting	and	on	the	aggregate	are	less	likely	to	comply	with	international	rules.		
	 Independent	organizations	that	build	rules	and	have	some	responsibility	to	ensure	
compliance	appear	to	be	best	related	to	successful	international	regulatory	outcomes.	From	the	
countries	examined,	all	struggled	with	compliance	to	varying	degree	except	for	New	Zealand	
that	had	financial	regulatory	independence	codified	into	law	and	Canada	with	its	completely	
independent	standards	board.	Once	politics	are	introduced	into	international	regulatory	
agreements,	compliance	may	only	occur	in	the	best	of	circumstances.		
	 Agency	independence,	however,	does	not	solve	the	issues	of	cooperation	and	
coordination	discussed	in	the	previous	chapters.	Canada,	for	example,	still	has	not	fully	adopted	
all85	IFRS	rules	though	they	are	following	a	gradual	plan	of	adoption.	Canada	also	plans	to	
exclude	some	firms	from	IFRS	and	still	allows	some	businesses	to	use	US	rules	if	they	wish.	
These	moves	were	made	in	consultation	with	financial	and	industry	experts.	However,	for	the	
IFRS	rules	Canada’s	AcSB	has	adopted,	there	have	been	no	notable	compliance	issues	since	
adoption	(around	2011).	Likewise,	New	Zealand	has	also	shielded	some	industries	from	IFRS	
																																																						
85	The	data	here	I	refer	to	is	from	2015.	Supposedly,	Canada	will	use	all	IFRS	rules	in	2017	and	
that	is	why	various	tables	in	this	project	show	the	country	as	a	full	cooperator.		
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and	has	a	few	cooperation	issues86	with	how	one	international	rule,	regarding	disclosures,	
applies	to	larger	firms.		
	 Finally,	compliance	data	is	not	widely	available	and	this	creates	issues	for	those	studying	
the	politics	of	international	regulatory	outcomes.	Additionally,	within	the	area	of	international	
regulation,	there	are	varying	bodies	that	build,	coordinate,	and	comply	with	these	rules,	and	
there	are	a	plethora	of	different	issues	covered.	Regardless	of	issue	area,	these	kinds	of	
international	agreements	should	still	require	some	type	of	technical	expertise	or	input	from	the	
private	sector	or	private	standards	boards.	The	greatest	successes,	when	politics	do	not	enter	
international	agreements,	will	garner	less	attention	such	as	the	W3C.		 	
																																																						
86	Here,	I	am	referring	to	the	fact	New	Zealand	has	slightly	different	rules	for	large	firms	in	
terms	of	what	must	be	disclosed.		
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Chapter	5	
The	Politics	of	International	Regulatory	Outcomes	
	
“The	objective,	as	much	as	possible,	is	one	IFRS,	but	that’s	a	lofty	goal	that	cannot	be	achieved...	
We	refer	to	[IFRS	as	issued	by	the	IASB,	EU,	local,	pre-MoU]	as	different	flavors	of	IFRS”		
	
-Margaret	Smyth,	IFRIC	member	(IASB	Body),	2009	
	
	
	 	
	 How	should	political	scientists	approach	international	regulatory	agreements	in	regards	
to	the	three	lenses	of	cooperation,	coordination,	and	compliance	I	have	presented	in	this	
project?		From	the	financial	regulations	explored	in	this	project,	there	is	a	meaningful	and	
sequential	way	to	analyze	the	way	international	agreements	unfold.	First,	cooperation	is	
typically	carved	out	followed	shortly	after	by	coordination	issues.	Compliance	issues,	along	with	
the	endorsement	possibilities,	are	introduced	later.	Within	these	stages,	there	are	also	several	
competing	domestic	interests	influencing	each.	For	example,	foreign	investment	concerns	and	
transparency	influence	cooperation	while	market	development	affects	decisions	about	which	
firms	in	a	country	may	use	IFRS.	Before	discussing	both	sequence	of	analysis	and	which	forces	
impact	the	political	side	of	these	agreements,	it	may	be	fruitful	to	explore	previous	
explanations	of	the	spread	of	regulatory	standards,	and	how	this	project	fits	in	the	grander	
scheme	of	international	relations	theory.		
	 Simmons	(2001),	in	a	similar	manner	to	Drezner	(2008),	understood	international	
regulatory	growth	as	an	expression	of	country	power	and	capital	markets.	This	would	be	true	to	
an	extent	if	all	countries	used	the	same	standard,	but	IFRS	comes	in	many	flavors	despite	the	
wishes	of	the	technical	experts	that	create	them.	Their	error,	in	part,	was	not	analyzing	the	
substance	of	these	agreements	(i.e.	how	they	unfold	and	what	they	cover).	This	does	not	mean	
	 126	
that	we	need	to	understand	every	micro	deviation	from	an	international	agreement	or	even	
understand	completely	the	regulations	covered	in	international	agreements.	It	is	only	necessary	
to	spot	large	gaps	in	cooperation.	The	gaps	and	differences	in	IFRS	are	big	enough	that	
countries	such	as	India	are	accused	by	the	IASB	as	only	using	IFRS	in	name.	Recognizing	these	
large	gaps	is	important	for	understanding	the	politics	of	international	regulatory	agreements	
and	avoids	incorrect	assessments	such	as	those	made	by	Simmons	and	Drezner.	The	lesson	
here	is:	Standards	across	countries	using	the	same	name	may	not	be	the	same	at	all.				
	 In	contrast,	Posner	(2009)	posited	the	politics	of	international	financial	regulation	were	
an	expression	of	specific	events	such	as	the	scandals	of	Enron	and	WorldComm	in	the	US.	These	
events	undoubtedly	pushed	countries	away	from	US	standards,	and	official	statements	from	
both	Australia	and	New	Zealand	support	his	claims.		However,	much	like	Simmons	and	Drezner,	
Posner	did	not	understand	the	different	flavors	of	these	international	agreements	and	the	
economic	and	political	implications	behind	large	deviations.	While	events	such	as	financial	
scandals	in	the	US	may	explain	IFRS	broad	growth,	events	such	as	the	2008	financial	crisis	
explain	IFRS	is	not	a	monolith	and	it	is	fragmented.		
	 This	fragmentation	meant	Abbot	&	Snidal	labeled	IFRS	as	a	transactional	standard	(a	
subset	of	international	regulatory	types),	but	in	some	ways	they	were	wrong	about	its	status	as	
a	transactional	standard.	A	transactional	standard	such	as	the	metric	system	only	works	well	
when	every	actor	uses	the	same	definitions.	Because	of	politics	in	the	financial	world,	two	
countries	using	IFRS	may	in	fact	be	measuring	one	million	dollars	of	debt	differently	whereas	
under	the	metric	system	a	meter	is	always	a	meter.	To	their	credit,	Abbot	&	Snidal	correctly	
assess	these	types	of	standards	are	subject	to	distributional	problems	and	IFRS	has	hundreds.		
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	 Buthe	&	Mattli	(2005	&	2011)	work	on	private	standards	boards	captures	how	the	
lobbying	process	of	firms	may	shape	IFRS,	but	ignore	the	work	done	by	governments	that	
structures	these	international	agreements.		Furthermore,	their	work	labels	private	standards	
boards	for	accounting	and	other	organizations	as	the	new	“global	rulers”,	yet	this	project	
rejects	the	notion	that	so	much	power	is	held	in	these	organizations.	At	an	international	level,	
they	mostly,	as	I	have	demonstrated,	shape	cooperation,	coordination,	and	compliance	with	a	
heavy	hand	of	government	at	each	stage.	These	organizations	are	far	more	powerful	than	
Drezner	argues	but	still	not	as	powerful	as	Buthe	&	Mattli	posit	in	their	work.		
	 Finally,	Fioretos	(2010)	argues	that	regulatory	outcomes	such	as	IFRS	are	the	result	of	
path	dependence	and	market	power	of	countries	in	a	similar	fashion	to	Simmons	and	Drezner.	
A	closer	examination	of	many	countries,	such	as	Greece	and	Romania	shows	this	is	untrue.	For	
example,	the	foundations	of	accounting	boards	in	these	countries	were	built	by	communist	
regimes	with	incompatible	rules.	To	explain	their	cooperation	with	the	IASB	on	IFRS,	a	different	
approach	is	necessary.	International	and	local	politics	have	catapulted	IFRS	into	countries	to	
varying	degrees	where	incompatible	standards	were	once	used.	Furthermore,	the	market	
power	argument	is	empirically	false	since	US	standards	faltered.			
	
Broader	International	Relations	and	this	Project		
	 In	the	grander	scheme	of	international	relations,	in	particular	international	cooperation,	
the	lessons	from	this	project	are:	(1)	cooperation	may	be	partial	and	asymmetric,	and	(2)	most	
international	regulatory	agreements,	especially	those	with	economic	impacts,	will	have	several	
junctures	with	the	possibility	of	failure.	On	the	first	note,	implicitly,	and	sometimes	explicitly	in	
	 128	
the	literature	on	international	cooperation,	the	literature	argues	diffusion	is	mostly	a	positive	
process	(Berry	&	Berry	2007;	Dobin	et	al.	2007;	Rogers	2003;	Simmons	&	Elkins	2004;	Weyland	
2007).		On	the	other	hand,	within	this	project	I	discuss	how	international	standards	are	subject	
to	backsliding	or	negative	diffusion.		
	
Cooperation	
However,	in	this	project	and	in	chapter	2	in	particular,	I	demonstrate	cooperation	
sometimes	takes	an	asymmetric	form	with	backsliding.	I	believe	this	occurs	with	all	
international	financial	agreements	from	IFRS	to	the	Basel	Accords	given	the	various	ways	capital	
rules	can	be	carved	out	or	even	reinterpreted.	Moreover,	all	financial	rules	(i.e.	accounting)	are	
political	and	subjective	and	this	makes	harmonious	international	agreements	difficult.		Beyond	
the	politics	of	international	finance,	areas	that	require	private	standards	committees,	such	as	
ISO	standards,	may	also	have	ample	opportunity	to	partially	cooperate	and	carve-out	rules.	
Future	research	may	find	it	most	fruitful	to	start	with	these	kinds	of	agreements	for	evidence	of	
partial	cooperation,	but	it	may	also	occur	in	formal	international	agreements	that	are	not	
filtered	through	private	technical	boards.			
This	partial	cooperation	also	fails	to	illicit	retaliation	from	countries	that	may	be	
harmed.	This	may	be	due	how	financial	standards	agreements	bundle	thousands	of	regulations	
together	and	even	experts	find	it	difficult	to	discern	exact	economic	impact	from	each	
deviation.	In	addition,	the	amount	gained	for	cooperating	on	just	a	partial	set	of	rules	is	greater	
than	the	harm	caused	in	most	instances	of	partial	cooperation.	In	contrast,	an	international	
	 129	
environmental	agreement	may	have	a	few	guidelines	and	a	deviation	will	cause	massive	
perceived	harm	to	fully	cooperating	countries.		
Furthermore,	transparency	from	financial	standards	is	an	international	public	good.	
Every	actor	benefits	when	other	actors	are	transparent	and	every	actor	is	harmed	when	
transparency	is	reduced.	Countries	cannot	deny	the	benefits	of	their	transparency	to	the	
countries	that	fail	to	cooperate,	yet	countries	continue	to	fully	cooperate	in	the	face	of	partial	
cooperation	of	others.	At	the	same	time,	no	international	agency	can	properly	enforce	either	
financial	transparency	and	reporting	rules.	To	maintain	this	public	good,	thousands	of	apolitical	
technical	experts	are	required.		
	
Coordination	
Like	cooperation,	the	outcome	from	coordination	issues	is	asymmetric	fulfillment	of	an	
international	agreement.	The	reasons	differ	in	the	sense	the	coordination	problem	may	be	
technical	(i.e.	lack	of	market	development)	though	may	have	an	economic	motive	(e.g.	access	
to	foreign	credit).	South	Korea	was	motivated	by	access	to	capital	from	the	World	Bank	and	
abroad	but	also	likely	applied	IFRS	selectively	due	to	underdevelopment	of	some	economic	
sectors.	The	technical	reasons	for	partial	fulfillment	of	an	international	agreement	may	only	
delay	some	sectors	but	not	prevent	full	coordination	in	the	long	run.		
Reciprocation	of	these	regulatory	agreements	tends	to	occur	in	different	sectors	such	as	
banks	in	one	country	and	the	extractive	sector	in	another	country.	This	may	tell	us	international	
actors	care	more	about	the	growth	of	standards	with	the	hope	they	eventually	become	
ubiquitous	more	than	their	universal	immediate	application.	For	long-term	goals,	organizations	
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responsible	for	regulatory	law	must	believe	in	increasing	harmony	instead	of	the	discord	with	
IFRS	type	agreements.	It	may	be	the	view	that	using	70%	of	the	same	standards	is	better	than	
none	at	all.		
IFRS	used	exclusively	for	the	financial	sector	is	a	common	coordination	outcome	and	this	
is	important	since	this	sector	threatens	global	stability	the	most.	If	most	countries	create	more	
transparency	in	their	financial	sectors,	there	may	be	less	incentive	for	organizations	like	the	
IASB	to	withhold	support	from	partial	coordinators.	Thus,	while	retailers	using	IFRS	may	benefit	
everyone,	transparency	in	the	financial	industry	may	also	stop	IASB	from	punishing	partial	
coordination	in	the	short	term.	Global	public	goods	such	as	bank	transparency	may	cause	
agreements	to	work	even	in	the	face	of	asymmetric	efforts.				
	
Compliance		
	 The	compliance	issues	are	quite	different	than	the	cooperation	and	coordination	
problems	and,	in	the	grander	sense,	speak	more	to	the	arguments	of	central	bank	
independence.	How	standards	boards	handle	the	financial	reporting	requirements	of	their	
international	agreements	is	similar	to	the	somewhat	parallel	literature	on	central	banks	from	
Alesina	&	Summers	(1993)	and	Keefer	&	Stasavage	(2003).	In	both	instances,	the	political	
appointment	or	control	over	an	institution	harms	the	institutions’	broad	economic	goals.	The	
main	difference	is	that	I	focus	compliance	whereas	the	central	bank	literature	speaks	more	
about	domestic	credibility.		
Agency	dependence	must	be	combined	with	an	external	shock	(e.g.	election	or	
economic	crisis)	for	noncompliance,	and	this	is	supported	by	findings	from	Alt	et	al.	2014.	
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International	regulatory	agreements	must	have	a	domestic	impetus	for	deviation,	and	
sometimes	this	may	also	strip	an	independent	agency	of	its	independence.	For	example,	the	
FASB	of	many	powers	post	2008	in	the	wake	of	the	financial	crisis.	However,	since	these	
standards	boards	have	only	existed	in	the	last	sixty	years,	it	is	unclear	if	dependent	agencies	
may	become	independent	again	in	the	future.	There	have	been	no	reversals87	of	agency	
dependency.		
Compliance	is	also	dependent	on	the	number	of	veto	players	with	less	in	countries	that	
maintain	independent	agencies.	Threats	to	funding,	political	delay,	and	political	interpretation	
of	rules	all	create	different	junctures	with	veto	players.		Countries	will	continue	to	use	political	
standards	boards	as	long	as	the	IASB	lacks	the	power	to	enforce	the	public	good	of	financial	
transparency.			
	
International	Standards:	Not	About	Great	Powers		
	 As	Drezner	(2008)	and	Simmons	(2001)	posited	regulatory	outcomes	tend	to	reflect	
great	powers’	preferences	or	their	market	power	respectively,	I	must	also	address	the	EU’s	
disproportionate	role	in	IFRS.	These	rules	originate	from	a	private	body	in	the	EU	and	the	EU	
was	one	of	the	earliest	adopters	of	the	regulations.	However,	in	light	of	Drezner	and	Simmons,	
it	is	important	to	consider	there	are	great	disagreements	between	the	IASB	and	EU	Commission	
and	the	EU	commission	has	not	been	successful	in	changing	many	IASB	policies.		
																																																						
87	In	a	very	small	way,	New	Zealand	strengthened	its	already	independent	endorsement	body	
(the	body	responsible	for	compliance)	in	2011.	Thus,	agencies	have	become	more	independent	
or	protected	but	have	not	made	a	complete	switch	from	dependent	to	independent.		
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	 First,	arguably	the	IASB	has	made	only	a	few	rules	because	of	the	EU.	For	example,	the	
EU	Commission’s	funding	threat	likely	altered	IAS	9	(discussed	in	chapter	4),	and	the	IASB	
altered	some	rules	to	help	Greece	alleviate	its	crisis	post	2008.		For	the	most	part,	the	EU	
Commission	and	EU	states	have	been	at	odds	with	some	IASB	policies	and	this	has	led	to	rule	
carve	outs	and	noncompliance.	If	the	EU	Commission	truly	shaped	the	regulatory	decisions	of	
the	IASB,	there	would	not	be	large	deviations	in	policy.	Financial	reporting	that	indicates	
different	versions	of	IFRS,	such	as	the	EU’s	version,	would	be	eliminated.	However,	because	the	
EU	is	the	largest	block	of	countries	with	the	largest	market	to	use	IFRS,	it	is	arguable	that	many	
of	the	rules	developed	have	the	EU	market’s	interest	in	mind.		
	 The	causal	arrow	in	explanations	of	Simmons	and	Drezner	is	in	the	wrong	direction	for	
many	international	rules.	It	is	not	that	great	powers	such	as	the	US	or	EU	get	to	decide	the	
rules,	but	rather	private	regulatory	agencies	make	rules	that	may	best	fit	these	markets.	The	
occurrence	of	entirely	different	and	new	rules	at	the	request	of	the	EU	Commission	occurs	
much	less	than	rules	created	to	fit	the	market	by	private	agencies.	Great	powers,	like	the	US	
and	EU,	partially	cooperate	or	coordinate	on	rules	as	they	receive	them.	Later,	these	same	
countries	decide	their	compliance	policies	such	as	an	endorsement	board.		
	 Finally,	if	power	was	the	determining	factor	in	the	spread	of	international	standards,	this	
project	would	be	dissecting	the	politics	of	US	GAAP	around	the	world	(as	Simmons	predicted	US	
GAAP	would	dominate	after	2001).	There	are	clearly	other	forces	at	play	and	the	spread	of	IFRS	
and	its	politics	go	beyond	simple	calculations	of	international	market	power.	All	states	utilizing	
IFRS	seem	to	have	a	shared	interest	in	promoting	the	global	public	good	of	transparency	even	if	
contributions	toward	this	goal	are	uneven.		
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Through	the	Lenses		
	 How	should	the	lens	of	cooperation,	coordination,	and	compliance	be	used	together?		
First,	these	are	not	meant	to	be	mutually	exclusive	ways	of	analyzing	the	politics	of	regulatory	
agreements.	These	forces	may	act	together	at	the	same	time	in	a	given	country	or	only	one	
issue	such	as	cooperation	may	dominate.	Second,	in	most	cases	these	can	be	analyzed	
sequentially.	Finally,	some	issues	outside	of	broad	international	financial	agreements	may	only	
be	analyzed	by	one	or	two	of	the	three	lenses.	For	example,	not	every	agreement	will	have	
coordination	issues	across	industry	since	some	agreements	will	only	apply	to	one	economic	
sector	or	set	of	firms.	Additionally,	the	compliance	lens	may	fail	when	an	international	agency	
has	the	power	to	enforce	treaty	obligations.	Broadly,	for	international	agreements	that	should88	
be	in	the	hands	of	private	regulators,	these	lenses	should	apply	and	also	to	some	formal	
agreements	(e.g.	Basel	Accords)	that	require	technical	experts	for	implementation.		
	 Since	compliance	outcomes	always	follow	cooperation	and	coordination,	control	over	
compliance	will	determine	in	part	a	country’s	cooperation	and	coordination	strategy.	In	other	
words,	anticipated	compliance	shapes	how	countries	may	carve-out	rules	or	sectors	in	the	
initial	agreement.	I	discuss	this	after	cooperation	and	coordination	below.	
	
First	Cooperation	and	Coordination		
	 First	it	is	useful	to	identify	if	the	regulatory	agreement	is	a	public	good	with	
distributional	problems.	These	types	of	agreements	will	be	the	most	susceptible	to	partial	
																																																						
88	I	mean	for	agreements	like	IFRS	that	are	supposed	to	be	between	private	regulators,	yet	
often	governments	and	political	intervention	dominate	how	the	agreements	unfolds.	
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cooperation.	A	public	good,	such	as	the	global	financial	stability	of	the	Basel	Accords,	may	be	
important	enough	for	states	to	continue	cooperation	even	in	the	face	of	partial	cooperation	(or	
backsliding)	by	other	states.	In	most	cases,	these	rule	carve-outs	for	IFRS	have	manifested	
shortly	after	(within	a	year)	of	the	initial	agreement.	In	fact,	shortly	after	its	agreement	with	the	
IASB,	the	EU’s	regulatory	law	requiring	IFRS	had	rule	carve-outs	written	into	it.			
	 Next,	can	the	distributional	gains	be	divided?	If	so,	there	is	more	likely	to	be	partial	
cooperation	as	countries	move	to	capture	extra	gains	by	cheating	on	the	margins.	If	not,	there	
will	either	be	full	or	no	cooperation	among	signatories.	Thus,	if	a	regulatory	agreement	is	a	
public	good	with	distributional	gains	that	can	be	divided,	it	may	have	a	larger	potential	for	
partial	cooperation	that	can	be	identified	in	an	early	stage.	This	partial	cooperation	may	be	
present	as	legislation	or	as	rules	by	private	boards	that	nullify	parts	of	an	international	
agreement.	Furthermore,	coordination	problems	can	exist	independent	of	the	result	of	partial	
cooperation.	
	 International	coordination	issues	tend	to	develop	sometime	after	rule	carve-outs	when	
the	final	rules	are	known.	Industries	are	commonly	excluded	with	the	promise	of	being	
integrated	later.	For	example,	almost	all	IFRS	agreements	contain	language	of	a	gradual	phase	
in	of	private	firms	in	the	future.89	Also	common	in	agreements	is	specific	language	excluding	
banks	or	insurance	(i.e.	the	industries	that	are	impacted	the	most)	for	3	to	5	years.	For	example,	
Brazil	gradually	phased	in	its	banks	after	a	3-year	period	and	Greece	phased	in	financial	
institutions	during	a	5-year	period.				
																																																						
89	Despite	promises,	most	countries	continue	to	develop	parallel	systems	of	accounting	
standards.	One	for	the	private	firms	and	one	for	public	companies.	In	the	long	run,	this	means	
there	will	continue	to	be	divergence	in	standards.		
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	 The	key	question	to	ask	for	coordination	is:	what	industries	will	an	international	
regulatory	agreement	impact?	When	the	broad	economy	is	effected,	it	is	more	likely	
coordination	issues	will	develop	with	specific	firms	claiming	they	should	be	exempt.	On	the	
other	hand,	more	specific	agreements,	like	the	Basel	Accords,	should	be	more	successful	since	
exempting	an	industry	would	nullify	the	agreement	entirely.		
	 A	small	subset	of	countries,	such	as	South	Korea,	may	appear	to	develop	their	level	of	
cooperation	and	coordination	at	the	same	time.	However,	in	South	Korea’s	process,	it	was	not	
until	the	level	of	cooperation	was	decided	that	the	government	meet	with	lobbyist,	the	private	
standards	board,	and	technical	experts	to	discuss	which	firms	should	be	excluded	from	the	
agreement.	Still	a	small	set	of	rule	carve-outs	may	develop	later	(typically	through	legislation)	
and	coordination	issues	may	arise	years	later	as	firms	fail	to	transition	or	lobby	against	a	
transition.		
The	problem	with	standards	is	the	total	number	is	meaningless.		This	is	because	one	
standard	can	have	more	economic	and	financial	impact	than	10	other	standards.		It	is	about	the	
quality	and	not	the	quantity.	Thus,	the	small	number	of	cooperation	and	coordination	issues	
that	may	develop	later	may	be	more	impactful	than	those	that	existed	at	the	inception	of	IFRS.	
However,	on	the	aggregate,	a	larger	number	of	cooperation	issues	occur	at	the	start	of	an	
agreement	and	these	are	followed	by	coordination	issues.		
	
Compliance	Shaped	by	Cooperation	and	Coordination		
	 In	terms	of	regulatory	agreements,	the	types	of	compliance	issues	I	have	outlined	will	
only	occur	when	private	bodies	responsible	for	interpreting,	disseminating,	and,	to	a	lesser	
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extent,	enforcing	the	rules	are	beholden	to	a	political	process.	This	assertion	is	also	
demonstrated	by	Art	et	al	(2014)	for	elections	in	terms	of	compliance	with	IFRS.	When	
governments	maintain	political	control	over	standards	boards,	there	is	less	of	a	necessity	to	
interfere	with	cooperation	or	coordination	at	the	onset	of	IFRS.	Noncompliance	is	mostly	used	
as	a	temporary	fix	for	economic	maladies	and	it	is	unclear	if	it	is	an	effective	long-term	political	
solution	to	the	perceived	negative	side	effects	of	standards	(e.g.	when	there	is	disagreement	
about	valuation	of	debt	like	in	Greece).		
	 For	countries	with	political	control	over	the	compliance	process,	the	key	questions	are:	
(1)	is	noncompliance	shielding	a	particular	sector	or	set	of	firms	(coordination	issues)	or	(2)	is	it	
protecting	FDI	inflows	by	ignoring	or	reinterpreting	rules	(cooperation	issues),	and	(3)	is	it	
temporary	noncompliance	with	the	goal	of	stability	over	transparency	(this	is	the	main	use	of	
noncompliance).	The	first	two	questions	help	determine	if	a	country	is	fully	cooperating	or	
coordinating	in	the	long	run	and	have	utilized	compliance	to	tackle	issues	of	cooperation	and	
coordination	in	the	short-run.			
	 Short-run	noncompliance	can	also	be	used	without	a	nefarious	motive.	For	example,	
endorsement	boards	typically	ask	for	clarification	or	how	they	should	apply	a	new	IFRS	rule	and	
sometimes	it	may	take	IFRIC	a	year	to	settle	disputes.	While	this	is	common,	it	also	easy	to	
identify	situations	where	endorsement	boards	have	abused	this	power	such	as	the	EU	
Commission	when	it	delayed	IAS	9	by	over	10	years.	An	EU	Commission	with	perfect	
information	would	have	likely	used	cooperation	carve-outs	at	the	inception	of	IFRS	to	avoid	the	
IAS	9	situation,	but	instead	was	forced	to	utilize	its	enforcement	power.		
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	 For	the	countries	that	did	not	create	a	noncompliance	mechanism	(an	endorsement	
body)	at	the	start	of	IFRS,	there	have	been	no	moves	to	introduce	such	a	mechanism.	This	may	
mean	these	countries	locked	in	divergent	policies	at	the	start	of	IFRS	and	these	were	large	
enough	to	negate	the	need	for	a	noncompliance	mechanism.	India,	for	example,	has	such	
severe	cooperation	and	coordination	carve-outs	that	the	IASB	has	questioned	its	use	of	the	
name	IFRS,	but,	at	the	same	time,	India	has	no	endorsement	body.	India’s	finance	minister	and	
parliament	may	believe	the	carve-outs	at	inception	will	stave	off	the	need	for	a	noncompliance	
mechanism	in	the	future.	On	the	other	hand,	Argentina	has	not	carved-out	any	IFRS	rules,	yet	
regulators	maintain	an	endorsement	mechanism	to	change	compliance	in	the	short-run	with	
any	rules	that	may	not	benefit	Argentina.		
	
Final	Thoughts	on	Compliance		
	 Thus,	especially	when	examining	the	politics	of	financial	regulatory	agreements,	it	is	
important	to	note	how	cooperation	and	coordination	are	mitigated	in	an	initial	agreement	and	
how	noncompliance	mechanisms	can	be	used	to	achieve	similar	goals	to	partial	cooperation	
and	partial	coordination.	Typically,	countries90	without	noncompliance	mechanisms	are	the	
greatest	users	of	partial	cooperation	and	coordination,	and	countries	with	noncompliance	
mechanisms	carve-out	less	rules	and	industries	from	their	initial	agreements.		
In	this	project,	I	have	not	made	an	effort	to	demonstrate	systemically	the	exact	impact	
of	each	rule	carve-out	or	issue	of	noncompliance.	This	is	extremely	difficult,	even	for	experts,	to	
																																																						
90	While	the	data	to	thoroughly	test	this	does	not	exist,	in	the	countries	that	are	investigated	in	
this	project	(chapter	4	and	elsewhere)	this	clearly	seems	to	be	a	trend.		
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measure.	Such	analysis	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	project,	yet	for	the	countries	analyzed	
noncompliance	tends	to	be	much	more	severe	when	rule	carve-outs	were	not	deep	or	were	
nonexistent	at	the	inception	of	IFRS.		
	 Despite	all	the	paths	possible	to	mitigate	the	requirements	of	an	international	
regulatory	agreement	,	many	countries	such	as	Qatar,	Ghana,	and	Costa	Rica91	continue	to	be	
free	of	any	cooperation,	coordination,	or	compliance	issues.	Thus,	there	are	many	countries	
that	mostly	adhere	to	the	rules.	Within	the	countries	with	deviations,	such	as	Brazil	or	China,	
most	rules	are	still	the	same	as	their	internationally	counterparts.	The	problems	discussed	in	
this	project	broadly	focus	on	larger	carve-outs	and	deviations,	which	are	incredibly	impactful	to	
international	businesses	and	investors,	and	these	deviations	are	due	to	political	forces.	These	
deviations	do	not	necessarily	mean	that	IFRS	are	entirely	useless	since	some	rules	are	still	
followed.			
	
All	Accounting	is	Political			
	 For	as	much	of	this	project	that	speaks	to	the	failures	of	international	financial	
standards,	globally	the	adoption	of	IFRS	has	been	increasing	and	most	rules	are	adopted	
without	disagreement.	The	transparency	and	international	comparability	of	firms,	which	stems	
from	IFRS,	is	a	public	good	that	benefits	global	economy.	However,	under	a	microscope	there	
are	several	cracks	within	standards	that	upset	convergence.	The	countries	within	the	EU,	for	
																																																						
91	Technically,	Costa	Rica	excludes	banks	from	IFRS,	but	most	of	the	agreement	remains	intact	
and	there	is	no	mechanism	for	noncompliance.		
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example,	are	supposed	to	use	all	the	same	rules,	yet	there	is	a	plethora	of	differences	from	
country	to	country	(See	Table	1.1	or	Table	4.2	for	examples).		
	 The	mechanisms	for	divergence	with	the	IASB	will	continue	to	be	different,	yet	the	
motivations	for	divergence	will	always	be	for	economic	gain.	This	is	inherent	in	any	standard	
that	is	subjective	and	open	to	interpretation.	The	politics	of	accounting	are	far	worse	than	other	
regulatory	standards	since	they	have	the	power	to	change	value	of	firms,	obscure	transparency,	
and	benefit	(even	if	temporary)	economies.	Furthermore,	few	countries	have	managed	to	keep	
accounting	entirely	independent	of	politics.		
	 Scandals	such	as	WorldCom	and	Enron	ignited	a	debate	surrounding	the	use	of	US	GAAP	
(both	within	the	US	and	abroad).	Scandals	such	as	these	are	the	rare	moments	that	the	public	
eye	briefly	catches	a	glimpse	of	how	much	accounting	rules	can	impact	the	economy.	These	
two	scandals	were	also	cited	by	New	Zealand	and	Australia	in	their	government	reports	to	
move	to	IFRS.	Without	a	better	strategy	to	mitigate	political	pressure	from	the	EU	Commission,	
the	IASB	may	find	IFRS	in	a	similar	position	to	US	GAAP	with	lost	confidence	and	possible	
scandals.	The	moves	made	to	lessen	Greek	debt	through	IFRS	(via	the	EU	Commission)	were	
arguably	far	worse	than	any	US	accounting	scandal.	
	 The	type	of	deviations	that	exist	within	IFRS	agreements	will	be	important	to	consider	in	
any	study	that	tackles	international	agreements	that	require	some	type	of	private	body	to	
negotiate,	implement,	or	interpret.	Buthe	&	Mattli	(2011)	may	have	overstated	the	importance	
of	these	new	types	of	agreements	and	regulators,	but	they	were	correct	in	their	argument	that	
they	will	continue	to	grow	and	cover	more	government	functions.	In	part,	this	is	due	to	the	fact	
governments	often	lack	the	technical	expertise	to	deal	with	problems	such	as	financial	
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reporting	or	ISO	standards.	This	trend	will	continue	in	the	financial	reporting	world	as	the	global	
economy	grows	and	as	new	financial	instruments	and	creative	accounting	is	born.			
	
Down	the	Rabbit	Hole	of	International	Regulatory	Outcomes	
	 The	goal	of	this	project	is	to	explore	why	international	regulatory	outcomes	concerned	
with	finance	are	so	fragmented	and	subject	to	backsliding,	yet	I	have	only	examined	a	small	
subset	of	political	problems	with	international	accounting	standards.	Other	scholars	have	
spoken	to	the	politics	of	IFRS	spread	(Abbot	&	Snidal	2001,	Buthe	&	Mattli	2011,	Simmons	
2001,	Poser	2006,	Posner	2010,	Porter	2014),	but	outside	of	this	project	no	one92	answered	
why	the	international	regulatory	outcomes	with	IFRS	are	so	diverse	and	lead	to	negative	
diffusion.	With	increased	changes	in	the	last	decade,	it	is	unclear	when	or	if	fragmentation	will	
stop	within	international	financial	standards.		
	 Brexit,	which	is	still	ongoing	at	the	time	of	this	project,	is	expected	to	have	serious	
implications	for	the	growth	and	future	of	the	IASB.	While	IASB	headquarters	are	located	in	
London,	the	Financial	Review	Council	(Britain’s	private	regulator)	is	expected93	to	change	many	
financial	reporting	regulations.	It	is	doubtful	Britain’s	exit	from	IFRS	will	cause	a	cascade	of	
countries	dropping	the	standards,	but	it	is	possible	Britain	may	develop	a	new	path	that	
																																																						
92	Hail	et	al.	2010	discuss	potential	future	scenarios	and	how	US	politics	plays	into	potential	
fragmentation	with	US	IFRS	use,	but	I	have	yet	to	see	a	paper	that	approaches	fragmentation	
internationally	as	I	have	here.		
93	Win	Bischoff,	chairman	of	the	FRC,	claims	the	UK	will	stay	(as	of	May	2017).	However,	the	UK	
government	has	already	developed	a	plan	to	decide	new	reforms	and	potentially	change	the	
FRC.		
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countries	will	follow	in	the	future	that	is	independent	of	the	IASB.	However,	this	is	still	only	a	
small	concern.	
	 Future	work	would	benefit	from	analyzing	the	fragmentation	and	backsliding	in	other	
international	regulatory	agreements	outside	of	the	finance	world.	The	problem	in	analyzing	the	
political	processes	of	rules	like	ISO	standards	is	there	may	not	exist	expert	bodies	(such	as	the	
big	four	accounting	firms	here)	that	help	define	things	such	as	partial	cooperation.	For	this	
project,	a	deep	understanding	of	accounting	was	necessary,	but	I	was	also	aided	by	Deloitte	and	
other	expert	bodies	that	publically	make	information	available	about	partial	cooperation,	
coordination,	and	compliance.	Thus,	research	on	other	regulatory	agreements	may	require	
enormous	investment	in	regards	to	learning	the	regulations	and	the	time	needed	to	classify	
agreements	(in	the	sense	of	partial	cooperation,	coordination,	and	compliance).		
	 From	this	project,	the	main	takeaway	should	be	that	seemly	technical	standards	can	be	
intensely	political,	and	partial	cooperation	with	negative	diffusion	and	backsliding	is	common	in	
these	types	of	international	standards.	The	political	interpretations	of	value	hinder	standards’	
global	use	and	the	benefits	countries	could	gain.	Benefits	can	be	squandered	in	different	ways	
depending	on	the	route	a	country	takes	to	adopt	IFRS.	The	unique	issues	within	cooperation,	
coordination,	and	compliance	threaten	to	make	international	financial	standards	meaningless	
in	the	long-run.		
	 Lastly,	as	stated	in	the	introduction,	standards	are	more	similar	now	than	at	any	other	
time	in	history.	I	made	no	precise	effort	nor	do	I	think	it	is	possible	to	predict	the	future	of	
standards	harmonization.	All	evidence	suggests	standards	have	already	begun	to	break	down	to	
an	extent.	Countries	like	India,	which	may	only	use	IFRS	in	name,	may	be	the	worst	offenders	at	
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the	moment.	How	the	IASB	or	any	future	organization	can	prevent	fragmentation	is	beyond	the	
scope	of	this	paper.	If	fragmentation	continues,	a	new	standard	will	replace	IFRS	just	as	IFRS	
replaced	US	GAAP	in	the	early	2000s.	Understanding	IFRS	failures	lends	new	insight	in	the	area	
of	diffusion	literature	and	other	areas	of	international	relations.	These	issues	are	also	policy	
relevant	to	a	small	extent.		As	global	finance	continues	to	change,	these	core	challenges	facing	
IFRS	will	continue	to	be	as	critical	as	they	have	been	for	the	last	60	years	in	the	world	of	
international	accounting.		
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